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JUMPSTARTING GATT 
by Jagdish Bhagwati 
On December 7, 1990, the Uruguay Round 
talks on the multilateral trading system broke 
down. These talks are aimed at redesigning and 
revitalizing the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), which oversees world trade. 
In essence, the United States walked out as the 
European Community (EC) dug in its heels 
over the issue of agricultural export subsidies. 
Washington's negotiating strategy had been 
to use EC concessions on agriculture, partly to 
benefit the United States directly, but more to 
win the support of key developing countries for 
its position on other trade issues. In return for 
agricultural liberalization, it had hoped develop- 
ing countries would consent to new disciplines 
on trade in services, to stricter intellectual 
property rights, and to limits on their regula- 
tion of foreign investment-matters of interest 
and profit principally to the United States and 
other developed nations. The EC agriculture 
offer was simply not substantial enough to 
strike this grand deal. 
Temporarily suspended, the talks have now 
resumed at the technical level. But their suc- 
cessful conclusion requires that the fast-track 
authority granted by Congress to the Bush 
administration, making possible a straight vote 
on the entire package of GATT reforms in lieu 
of votes on each item, be extended beyond the 
end of May. Barring a highly improbable reso- 
lution of disapproval by either house of Con- 
gress, fast-track authority will be extended two 
more years, during which a final deal must be 
struck. 
Having brilliantly maneuvered the EC into a 
difficult position, the Bush administration is 
nonetheless unlikely to push the Uruguay 
Round to a successful conclusion unless it now 
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recognizes that its bargaining leverage is not as 
strong as earlier believed. The EC may be over 
a barrel, but the barrel can roll right out of the 
negotiating arena. The United States has three 
strategy options: inaction, threats, and incen- 
tives. Of these, the last may be the most prom- 
ising and also the least explored. The strategy 
of inaction presumes that the EC cannot afford 
to derail GATT because the stakes are too high 
and the guilt would be too great. This pre- 
sumption is not compelling. 
The stakes are indeed high. The Uruguay 
Round, launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, 
in 1986, is the single most important trade 
negotiation since GATT's creation in October 
1947. Its agenda is complex, its promise consid- 
erable. GATr's rewards rest critically on what 
economists call a "fix-rule" trading regime: 
Member nations compete according to rules 
and generally the chips fall where they may. 
This conception contrasts with "fix-quantity" 
trading systems, or what is known popularly as 
"results-oriented" or "managed" trade. There, 
bureaucrats and politicians negotiate quantities, 
not rules, and the former determine who will 
trade what. GATT matters to many who believe 
that significant efficiency gains come through a 
world trading system that lets markets work 
unimpeded by tariffs, quotas, and other inter- 
ventions. 
A prime example of the Uruguay Round's 
relevance and importance is the exclusion to 
date of services from the provenance of GATT, 
and the intention now to redress that omission. 
If successful, the Uruguay Round will extend 
the discipline of a fix-rule trading regime to 
this new set of sectors, including accounting, 
airlines, banking, construction, insurance, legal 
services, medical services, and telecommunica- 
tions. Such services generate nearly a quarter of 
world trade today. 
At the same time, the Uruguay Round will 
begin to bring discipline to such older econom- 
ic sectors as agriculture and textiles. Ironically, 
it was the United States that in 1955 exempted 
agriculture from GATT controls with a widely 
followed waiver. Now the sector is riddled 
worldwide with myriad market-distorting inter- 
ventions. Textiles, too, have been heavily pro- 
tected since 1961 when the United States, 
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under pressure from domestic interests, helped 
negotiate the Short-term Arrangement on In- 
ternational Trade in Cotton Textiles that sur- 
vived long term as the Multifiber Agreement 
(MFA). 
Yet the failure to extend GATT's mandate to 
new sectors and to restore discipline to old 
ones would entail not only the costs of missed 
opportunities, great as they are. The probable 
ensuing consequences also carry costs, which 
could be very large. The breakdown of negotia- 
tions critical to strengthening the common 
institutions of an increasingly interdependent 
global economy could undermine confidence in 
the capacity of key nations to provide necessary 
leadership. One failure may engender many 
others. 
Further, there are more immediate costs, in 
particular a resurgence of protectionism. Econ- 
omists distinguish between the demand for pro- 
tection (from firms, unions, and communities) 
and the supply of protection (by the adminis- 
tration and Congress). The supply of protection 
would probably increase because an irate Con- 
gress would more readily accept demands for 
protection from its constituents if it believed 
that the EC and others had failed to accept 
American demands for more open markets. 
Then again, if the United States were to give 
in to protectionist demands, which are likely to 
increase thanks to the recent recession, as all 
previous experience suggests, so would its trad- 
ing partners. Competitive "beggar-thy-neigh- 
bor" trade restraints could accentuate the reces- 
sion much the way the global proliferation of 
tariffs is generally believed to have followed the 
U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. 
Trade restraints and tariff wars are not the 
only likely outcomes. In agriculture, the failure 
to reach agreement could mean export-subsidy 
wars, as the United States starts to match subsi- 
dies the EC refuses to surrender. Similarly, 
reductions in agricultural income-support pay- 
ments in the 1990 U.S. budget that are contin- 
gent on EC concessions on agriculture at the 
Uruguay Round could be lost. The lost chance 
to reduce income supports coupled with higher 
export subsidies would doubly strain the U.S. 
budget at a time when the United States can 
least afford it. 
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Congress is also likely to become less com- 
mitted to GATT's multilateralism and more 
enamored with quick-fixes like regionalism and 
unilateralism-the former leading to the forma- 
tion of free-trade areas south of the Rio 
Grande, the latter rooted in American use of 
economic power to extract unilateral conces- 
sions from weaker trading partners. Congress 
has recently flirted with both alternatives, as 
panic and petulance break out over the contin- 
uing trade deficit and the rise ofJapan. Region- 
alism threatens to fragment the world economy; 
unilateralism undermines GATT's central tenet 
that the strong and the weak should play by 
similar rules. Exacerbating these destructive 
trends in the United States would undermine 
the world trading system when the pressing 
task of the day is to reinforce it. 
The Blame Game 
Could the United States successfully blame 
the EC for all this mayhem? Not really. Much 
of the disarray would stem from American 
actions. Protestations by the Bush administra- 
tion that a frustrated Congress was the culprit 
may carry conviction among the experts, but 
foreign governments will only experience deja 
VU. 
There is an exaggerated but nonetheless real 
feeling in the EC bureaucracy that the United 
States unwisely backed the EC into a corner on 
an issue of utmost political difficulty. The 
"blame game" can be played equally well by 
the EC, and thus seriously undercuts the possi- 
bility of unilateral accommodation by the EC 
to break the Uruguay Round logjam. 
If guilt will not work, can shame suffice? 
Unfortunately, politicians in pluralistic democ- 
racies typically suffer from cognitive dissonance 
on trade policy. Some commentators have 
criticized French President Frangois Mitterrand 
for the incongruity between the high ground of 
his rhetoric on Third World needs and the low 
ground of his support for protection of 10 mil- 
lion relatively well-off EC farmers against hun- 
dreds of millions of farmers in less-developed 
countries. In the same vein, the MFA has pro- 
tected the senescent textile industries of most 
industrial countries in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
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(OECD) at the expense of developing countries, 
even as these same OECD countries spend large 
sums on aid programs. Altrusim has been easier 
in aid than in trade, because constituency poli- 
tics makes trade policy treacherous ground for 
the national interest. It is not likely, therefore, 
that Mitterrand will feel particularly embar- 
rassed by his unwillingness, which reflects his 
political inability, to yield more on agriculture. 
A strategy of threats to coerce the EC offers 
no better prospects. The twin components of a 
threat strategy would be American regionalism 
and unilateralism. Neither would wound the 
EC into submission. Instead, both promise to 
wound GATT. 
American regionalism is an empty threat o 
the EC. Arguably, the "regional card" in the 
shape of the 1988 U.S.-Canada Free Trade 
Agreement played a small role in prompting a 
reluctant EC to join multilateral negotiations it 
had rejected four years earlier. But when the 
question is not one of joining negotiations but 
instead of yielding in them, the threat approach 
is much less compelling. 
Besides, the prospective U.S. regional part- 
ners are the troubled countries of Latin Ameri- 
ca. It is not credible that the United States 
would divert its energies and trade to a region 
whose slow growth rates, fragile democracies, 
inflation, and debts offer a far less attractive 
market han the burgeoning Far East and EC. 
If the United States foolishly turns away from 
the world to its own backyard, the likely EC 
reaction would be: Go ahead. 
Nor can the United States expect the EC to 
bend because the threat of American regional- 
ism would weaken the multilateral trading 
system and reduce the benefits accruing to the 
EC. A staunch believer in the simultaneous 
practice of regionalism and multilateralism, the 
EC itself is, of course, a regional arrangement. 
It is unlikely to view the growth of similar 
regional arrangements elsewhere as necessarily 
harmful to the multilateral trading system. A 
warmer American embrace of regionalism is 
therefore unlikely to alarm the EC into re- 
newed efforts at the Uruguay Round, no matter 
how much it frightens those who see greater 
virtue in multilateralism. 
It is tempting to believe, however, that ag- 
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gressive unilateralism may pay off where re- 
gional initiatives do not. Since the passage of 
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act, the United States possesses weapons under 
sections 301-310, popularly known as Section, 
Super, and Special 301, designed not merely to 
enforce American trade rights, but also to ex- 
tract new concessions through tactics such as 
the threat of GATT-illegal tariff retaliations. 
The Super 301 sword, under which unaccept- 
able "priority practices" and "priority coun- 
tries" can be targeted for retaliation, is now 
sheathed because of the lapse of its two-year 
legislative mandate but was used on May 25, 
1989, by U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills 
against Brazil, India, and Japan. The "priority 
practices" objected to in these countries includ- 
ed many that were in fact compatible with 
these nations' trading rights as defined by 
GATT or other treaties. 
Resorting to the law of the jungle rather than 
the rule of law works only against the weak, 
making its successful application to the EC 
highly dubious. The EC is a sufficiently sizable 
economic power to preclude intimidation. 
Further, unlike the case of Japan, the imbalance 
of trade between the United States and the EC 
is not significant, suggesting a broadly equal 
stake in trade by both sides and lack of decisive 
power by either. For example, the EC was left 
out of the Super 301 hit list despite many 
American objections to EC policies. By 
promising tit-for-tat response, and even adding 
301-type legislation into its own arsenal, the 
EC has inured itself to undue pressure, though 
not to occasional trade battles like the U.S. 
invocation of 301 against the EC ban on 
hormone-fed beef in January 1989. 
The EC will only sit back and enjoy the ac- 
tion if the United States lashes out with 301 
actions against other weaker states to force one- 
on-one concessions it cannot procure through 
multilateral negotiations at the Uruguay Round. 
Nothing has drawn the wrath and condemna- 
tion of the world's trading nations more than 
America's 301 policy. 
Japan, too, is a great economic power capable 
of resisting 301-style intimidation. But Japan 
feels seriously exposed and thus far is unwilling 
to indulge in a tit-for-tat strategy toward either 
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the EC or the United States. It is an interesting 
question whether, and when, Japan will find the 
American fixation with Japan, and consequent 
attempts at imposing solutions on Japan for 
every imagined perfidy, intolerable and deserv- 
ing of a tougher response. 
The Bush administration is unlikely to 
push the Uruguay Round to a success- 
ful conclusion unless it now recog- 
nizes that its bargaining leverage is 
not as strong as earlier believed. 
Still, all is not lost in the Uruguay Round. 
An incentive strategy might bring the EC 
around. Such a strategy can be based on two 
wholly different but complementary ideas: one 
addressing fairness in balancing political costs in 
negotiated concessions between the EC and the 
United States, and the other relating to easing. 
the political cost to the EC. 
Economists think of mutual gain from trade 
transactions; negotiators think of mutual pain 
from trade concessions. It is improbable that a 
trade negotiation among equals could reach 
fruition unless each party felt the political cost 
of market-opening concessions was matched by 
costs to the other side. Reciprocity of benefits 
in terms of increased exports must be broadly 
matched by reciprocity of costs in terms of the 
political difficulty of accepting increased im- 
ports. 
In the current GATT standoff, the agreement 
that the EC rejected in December appears 
heavily unbalanced in favor of the United 
States in terms of political costs, relative to 
those of the EC, and especially France. The 
proposed deal essentially involves four elements: 
services, trade-related intellectual property 
rights (TRIPs), trade-related investment mea- 
sures (TRIMs), and agriculture. Only a decade 
ago this agenda would have seemed strange. 
After all, why are intellectual property and for- 
eign investment issues included in a trade nego- 
tiation, even if they are prefixed by the magic 
words "trade-related?" TR is, in fact, more 
aptly read as "tangentially related" than as 
"trade-related." 
The agenda reflects the changed politics of 
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trade policy in the United States, and this in 
turn explains the imbalance of political costs 
plaguing the current stalemate. Of late, U.S. 
trade politics has been marked by increased 
influence of producer interests in the design 
and execution of trade policy. Changes in the 
world economy in the 1980s have strengthened 
producer interests. The most compelling factor 
has been the "Diminished Giant Syndrome."' 
There is a national fear of being overtaken by 
East Asian nations, which will then create a 
new "Pacific century." Safeguarding U.S. pro- 
ducers against other competitors has gained 
such enormous importance that it now tends to 
dominate the definition of national interest. 
Interestingly, Japan's role as feared rival has 
contributed to this ideological shift. Popular 
attribution of Japan's economic success to a 
benign, symbiotic partnership between its gov- 
ernment and producers has led many to advo- 
cate following Japan's example. This belief has 
undermined the traditional American belief that 
the national interest is not simply an aggrega- 
tion of producer interests. Older Democrats 
who once argued that what was good for Gen- 
eral Motors was not necessarily good for the 
United States have been replaced by younger 
Democrats whose gut instinct is that what is 
good for Eastman Kodak cannot help but be 
good for America. 
The institutions defining trade policy have 
increasingly been reshaped to reflect this ideo- 
logical shift. Traditionally more responsive to 
producer interests, Congress has progressively 
recaptured trade policy from the administration, 
reversing its surrender to the administration 
following the Smoot-Hawley Tariff disaster. 
Particularly evident in the 1988 Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act were new limits 
on the scope of the administration's discretion, 
with mandatory requirements being imposed in 
some areas. 
Producer influence on trade policy has also 
arisen from necessity imposed by pluralistic 
'See Jagdish Bhagwati and Douglas Irwin, "The 
Retunz of the Reciprocitarians: U.S. Trade Policy To- 
day," The World Economy, June 1987, vol. 10. 
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politics during the 1980s. Faced by powerful 
protectionist pressures, the Reagan administra- 
tion yielded partially by negotiating export re- 
straints in autos, footwear, and steel. It allowed 
the dollar to fall. But it also encouraged a coali- 
tion of interests to counter protectionist lob- 
bies. Service sector lobbies were a natural can- 
didate as were industries such as pharmaceuti- 
cals and communications that had long felt 
intellectual property protection abroad was 
inadequate. Other potential allies were multina- 
tional companies that were unhappy with devel- 
oping-country restrictions and requirements on 
their operations, chiefly in the form of export- 
performance targets and local-content rules. 
Lobbies for TRIPs and TRIMs were thus ea- 
gerly embraced by the administration and dis- 
patched to Brussels and Geneva as part of the 
elite corps attending the multilateral trade talks. 
In turn, these lobbies saw in these negotiations 
a chance to gain concessions denied to them in 
other forums. The tangential relationship of 
TRIPs and TRIMs to actual trade issues was ig- 
nored, though some developing countries did 
object. Neither the absence of empirical evi- 
dence establishing that lack of intellectual prop- 
erty protection in fact adversely affects technical 
progress, nor the findings of theoretical re- 
search that intellectual property protection can 
harm developing countries even as it augments 
world efficiency, were allowed to stand in the 
way of putting TRIPs on the trade agenda. 
American spokespersons, such as the current 
and former U.S. trade representatives, Carla 
Hills and Clayton Yeutter, shifted from the 
utilitarian, efficiency-based, and mutual-gain 
reasoning underlying GATT to a "rights"-based 
assertion that inadequate intellectual property 
protection amounts to piracy or theft. 
From the perspective of political costs, then, 
an agreement that yields any concessions on 
services, TRIPS, TRIMS, and agriculture (where 
U.S. grain exports are expected to profit from 
liberalization) represents a nearly all-win situa- 
tion for the United States. The only political 
pain would be from the modest promise of 
market access on dairy products, peanuts, and 
sugar, and from concessions on textiles. The 
American agenda would have triumphed, its 
lobbies duly rewarded, and the pain principally 
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one of inadequate gain. 
For the EC, the role of producer interests in 
the Uruguay Round is very different. EC pro- 
ducers would profit equally from agreements on 
services, TRIPs, and TRIMs, but they are rela- 
tively ineffective lobbies; therefore, the political 
payoff is negligible. By contrast, liberalization 
of agriculture poses tremendous political diffi- 
culty in both France and Germany. So from 
the EC perspective, the agreement currently on 
the table looks alarmingly like an all-lose prop- 
osition in terms of political costs. 
The result is a massive imbalance of political 
costs from the proposed agreement that must 
be corrected if the Uruguay Round is to be 
successful. The United States must agree to ac- 
cept more pain, for example by allowing a 
substantially greater reduction of protection for 
dairy products, sugar, and peanuts-that is, by 
going the extra mile where it is politically 
tough. The United States could also undertake 
a faster and more comprehensive dismantling of 
its MFA restrictions than the EC. Now that 
President George Bush has emerged from the 
Persian Gulf war with great political clout, he 
can afford to shed the embarrassing MFA in a 
show of burden-sharing solidarity. It would also 
be a trade concession to developing nations that 
have suffered over the years from the MFA. 
At this point the spurned accord gives the 
benefit of concessions in the new areas to 
OECD countries without comparable conces- 
sions to developing countries. By extending 
benefits to developing countries that can in- 
crease textile and clothing exports, the overall 
settlement at the Uruguay Round could reduce 
the massive unfairness implicit in the accord 
currently promoted by the Cairns Group (a 
coalition of 14 countries exporting farm prod- 
ucts) and the United States. In addition, be- 
cause the EC has an export advantage over the 
United States in textiles, an accord that sub- 
stantially opens up textiles trade would afford 
the EC comparatively greater benefits than the 
United States, and the United States compar- 
atively greater pain. This would further narrow 
the gap in political costs that divides the EC 
from the United States. 
The acceptance of more pain would also 
imply a role reversal, enabling the United 
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States to appreciate that political costs make a 
difference and to consider acceptable only a 
modest revision upwards in the final EC offer 
on agriculture. In turn, the administration must 
persuade the lobbies and the Congress that the 
modest gains in regard to services, TRIPS, and 
TRIMS are significant when put into perspective. 
After all, these areas have escaped effective 
discipline over the last four decades because of 
their economic and political complexity. To 
expect more rapid and substantial progress in 
them within one negotiation when it took seven 
to reduce tariffs to their current low levels is to 
be not utopian but self-destructive. 
The Perestroika Solution 
While redressing the imbalance in political 
costs may well suffice, an added inducement on 
agriculture for the EC would surely help. Such 
an inducement could be provided by exploiting 
the necessity of food imports for the success of 
perestroika. The Soviet Union could offer a 
significant, if temporary, market for excess 
European farm production, cushioning the 
shock to EC farmers of a more substantial cut 
in agricultural export subsidies.2 
An agreement could be reached in which the 
EC would annually sell up to 20 million tons of 
grain and meat to the Soviet Union, close to 
half of the Soviet Union's 1989 imports, over a 
period of perhaps five years. The USSR would 
be granted long-term credits so that repayment 
in convertible currency would begin only in the 
sixth year. This arrangement would ensure that 
the Soviet Union, strapped for foreign ex- 
change, would be able to import this quantity 
above and beyond its normal imports, thus 
guaranteeing that the sale would represent a 
genuine new market. 
The sales would naturally gravitate to the 
furnishers of the credits, ensuring the EC (and 
the United States insofar as it extends credits) a 
share of the extra market. While the EC would 
lose some subsidy-financed markets by accept- 
ing further cuts in export subsidies at the Uru- 
2See Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai, "Making 
a Virtue of Moscow's Necessity," The New York 
Times, November 12, 1990. 
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guay Round, it would gain the new Soviet 
market. The EC's political cost from agricul- 
tural liberalization would be greatly eased until 
the expiration of the Soviet pact in five years, 
whereas the more competitive Cairns Group 
countries could immediately pick up markets 
abandoned by the EC as its current subsidies 
dwindled. At the end of five years the EC 
would be forced to adjust, and the world would 
retain the gains in agricultural liberalization 
agreed to at the Uruguay Round, thanks to the 
cushion provided by the Soviet pact. 
The Soviet Union could profitably use credit- 
financed supplements to its grain and meat sup- 
plies. Unfortunately, the Soviet problem was 
not limited to getting through this past winter 
with "emergency" food aid-a program that 
united the EC, the United States, and others. 
Over a longer period, the USSR will require 
sustained and sizable supplements to food sup- 
plies in order to make the transition to a mar- 
ket economy politically appealing. Supplemental 
imports need to be integrated systematically 
into a coherent economic reform plan if they 
are to have the maximum benefit. 
The Soviet problem is not one of falling food 
production. On the contrary, agricultural pro- 
duction is one of perestroika's success stories. 
Adjusted for weather variations, Soviet grain 
yields have increased at an accelerated pace 
during the Gorbachev years. Farms, by and 
large, have managed to bypass the state's pro- 
curement drive at controlled prices, instead 
selling food at higher prices in the marketplace. 
Food shortages in major cities reflect the de- 
clining procurement powers of the state: In 
1989 the procurement of 59 million tons of 
foodgrains fell well short of the 86 million ton 
target. Procurement shortfalls mean that the 
Soviet government has correspondingly less 
processed bread and meat to distribute at fixed, 
low prices in the state shops. As the main prob- 
lem intensifies, further shortfalls are anticipated 
and people will begin to drain stores of what- 
ever they can find, leading to unseemly scram- 
bles for vanishing sausages and bread that will 
fuel still further the frenzied emptying of 
shelves. 
Under the pact with the EC proposed here, 
imports would largely fill the gap left by lag- 
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ging procurement. Perestroika would be helped 
in several ways. For example, food would be 
immediately available in state stores in restive 
cities. This would help contain the revolution 
of falling expectations about what Soviet leaders 
can deliver. Expectations about future shortages 
and price hikes would be dampened by a large 
influx of food. Further, a deal with the EC 
would soak up excess Soviet expenditures, re- 
ducing the huge budget deficit-now 10 to 11 
per cent of gross national product-that is 
fueling an inflationary spiral. Moscow's need to 
slash investment expenditures (and not just de- 
fense spending) in order to reduce the budget 
deficit would be mitigated. One of the principal 
lessons of developmental p anning is that cut- 
ting investment for short-run, anti-inflationary 
objectives is unwise since it saps growth and 
creates erious problems later. 
Simultaneously buttressing perestroika and 
concluding the Uruguay Round by exploiting 
the complementarity of these tasks is attractive. 
Tragic events in Lithuania nd the increasing 
likelihood that perestroika may succumb to dis- 
integrative tendencies that Gorbachev can no 
longer control require that the proposed grain 
and meat agreement be contingent on three 
factors: the continuation ofglasnost, the groun- 
ding of perestroika in a coherent economic plan, 
and a reasonable prospect for the resolution of 
the political crisis between the center and the 
republics, without which no economic reform 
plan is credible. 
The recent resumption of EC credits worth $1 billion, which were suspended over the 
January 1991 Lithuanian repression, and re- 
newed EC confidence in Gorbachev's demo- 
cratic credentials and good intentions, if not in 
his ability to manage the increased domestic 
turbulence, suggest that marrying the Uruguay 
Round and perestroika remains an attractive way 
of advancing both causes. 
But all will be lost at the Uruguay Round 
unless U.S. officials reassess their fundamental 
strategy and develop an approach that takes 
into account the political realities faced by its 
key negotiating partners. 
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